Turkey’s Delicate Position Regarding the War in Iran

April 23, 2026 Greg Abolo

The Oasis Reporters

April 23, 2026

Albert Kandemir

Contractual doctoral researcher in International Relations, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas

Iranian nationals arrive in northeastern Turkey after crossing the border at Razi-Kapikoy, near Van, on March 2, 2026. Turkey, which already hosts three million Syrians, fears a massive influx of refugees from Iran if the war continues. Ali Ihsan Ozturk/AF

Albert Kandemir, Paris-Panthéon-Assas University

Albert Kandemir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

For Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Iran is both a rival in terms of regional supremacy and an ideological model very different from its own. But Tehran is also a major energy supplier and a partner in the repression of Kurdish fighters. Overall, it is a troublesome neighbor, but one with which Ankara has learned to cope. A potential fall of the Iranian regime could, moreover, be accompanied by an influx of refugees into Turkey. Beyond condemning the war, especially since it is largely being waged by Israel, with whom Turkey is at loggerheads, Erdogan’s government is therefore seeking to play the role of mediator to prevent major destabilization of the entire Middle East.

When describing the nature of the centuries-old relationship between Iran and Turkey, many analysts consider the Treaty of Zuhab (1639) to have been a turning point. Indeed, this agreement ended nearly 150 years of conflict between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires and established the border between the two states. Some even claim that this treaty has survived through the ages and has never been challenged. In reality, numerous conflicts arose after the Treaty of Zuhab. However, at the end of each war, the two empires systematically returned to a border close to that defined in 1639. Thus, a structural balance of power was established between the Turkish and Persian worlds: neither ever succeeded in absorbing or destroying the other.

This balance fostered the emergence of a complex diplomatic culture of forced coexistence that persists today and explains Turkey’s composure and caution regarding the war initiated by Israel and the United States against Iran on February 28, 2026.

Forced Coexistence: Relations Oscillating Between Structural Mistrust and Pragmatism

If, after the Second World War, Turkey and Iran were partners firmly rooted in the Western camp and united by the
First, economic interdependence. Indeed, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Turkey was a major economic outlet for Iran. Even today, Iran remains Ankara’s third-largest gas supplier after Russia and Azerbaijan. Given the Iranian economy’s sluggish performance and Turkey’s complete dependence on foreign energy suppliers, the two countries find themselves in a situation of mutual need.

Furthermore, while Iran maintains economic and strategic ties with Russia and China, it is relatively isolated internationally due to US sanctions and its support for organizations considered terrorist by Western countries, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis. Turkey, on the other hand, is both an economic partner of Russia, integrated into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and a member of NATO. The relationship with Ankara thus offers Iran a form of regional and international integration. Moreover, Turkey has been heavily involved as an intermediary in the negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the West regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

Furthermore, both countries share a repressive culture against any attempt at Kurdish political autonomy (it should be noted that Kurds represent approximately a quarter of the population in Turkey and a fifth of the population in Iran).

Thus, during the Syrian civil war, despite their differences, Ankara and Tehran sometimes collaborated to neutralize Kurdish positions. Generally speaking, Turkish and Iranian authorities acknowledge their cooperation in the fight against Kurdish organizations classified as terrorist groups, notably the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan), both organizations belonging to the Union of Communities of Kurdistan, which is accused of working towards the dismemberment of Turkey and Iran and of being supported by external powers, particularly Israel and the United States.

This is where another determining factor emerges in relations between Ankara and Tehran: mistrust of the Jewish state.

Why Turkey fears an Israeli political and military victory against Iran
To understand the Turkish position regarding the war in Iran, one must therefore start from three premises. First, Turkey’s caution in no way reflects an ideological affinity between Ankara and Tehran. As mentioned above, Turkey is heavily dependent on gas supplies from Iran. Moreover, due to various regional conflicts, Turkey has become the second-largest host country for refugees in the world – especially Syrians. This situation is causing numerous social, economic, and political tensions. One of the motivations for Turkey’s support of the rebel groups that contributed to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad was, in fact, his persistent refusal to negotiate the terms of the return of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Iran is the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, the vast majority of whom are Afghans. A regime change leading to a power vacuum is therefore seen by Turkey as an imminent danger that could trigger a new influx of refugees into its territory. In recent days, Turkey has militarized its border with Iran to prevent this risk.

Furthermore, Israel and the United States have repeatedly discussed the possibility of using Kurdish rebel groups to overthrow the Iranian regime. Currently, no reliable source confirms their involvement against the regime. However, if this were to materialize, Turkey would likely provide intelligence to Tehran to neutralize these forces. Ankara has already stated that it is closely monitoring the activities of the PJAK. While a direct Turkish operation on Iranian soil seems unlikely, it remains a possibility to consider. It is worth recalling that the objective of Turkey’s first military operation in Syria (“Euphrates Shield”) on August 24, 2016, was to prevent Kurdish political autonomy in northern Syria, on the Turkish border.

Finally, there is a widespread, cross-party belief in Turkey that Tel Aviv seeks to neutralize any power in the Near and Middle East whose interests conflict with its own. While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his “deep sadness and concern” over the attack launched against Iran by the United States and Israel, which he attributed to “a provocation by Benjamin Netanyahu,” the leader of the CHP (the main opposition party), Özgür Özel, made similar remarks: “Israel attacked Iran. Our party condemns these attacks in the strongest possible terms. We convey our feelings of solidarity to the Iranian people.”

Although Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize the State of Israel, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have deteriorated significantly since the late 2000s, following Erdoğan’s “one-minute speech” and the Israeli attack on the Marmara flotilla. Despite occasional attempts to resume dialogue, tensions have intensified in recent years—particularly due to Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’s attacks of October 7, 2023—and culminated after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.

Indeed, Turkey claims to be working to preserve the integrity of Syrian territory and accuses Israel of contributing to its fragmentation by supporting militant groups such as the Druze and Kurds, and of its dispossession by extending its illegal control over the Golan Heights. Thus, the two countries find themselves in a hegemonic competition in Syria. Consequently, from Turkey’s perspective, if Iran were to fall, due to its own rise to power, Ankara would be next on Israel’s list.

Numerous statements by Israeli officials support this view. Naftali Bennett, former prime minister (2021-2022), declared on February 17, 2026: “A new Turkish threat is emerging. Turkey is the new Iran. Erdogan is dangerous and seeks to encircle Israel.” While not as explicit, some

For example, Benjamin Netanyahu stated on February 22, 2026: “The goal is to create an axis of nations that share the same vision of reality, challenges, and objectives in the face of radical axes—both the radical Shiite axis, which we have dealt a severe blow to, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.” Since at least the early 2020s, numerous operations by Turkish intelligence services have targeted clandestine agents accused of collaborating with Israel and using Turkish territory as a battleground against Palestinian or Iranian agents of influence. These operations thus reveal growing, yet still diffuse and unspoken, tensions. In a region where several regimes deemed threats by Israel have been neutralized (Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Bashar al-Assad in Syria) and where some countries have normalized their relations with the Jewish state through the Abraham Accords, Turkey views with concern the prospect of an Israeli political and military victory in Iran, which would lead to the fall of the ayatollahs’ regime. Important nuances to consider: Turkey was the only NATO country (along with Spain) to unequivocally condemn Israeli-American belligerence and the only one to offer its condolences to Iran following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Nevertheless, Turkey and Iran have engaged in genuine wars of influence, particularly in Syria, where Iran supported Bashar al-Assad while Turkey armed the rebels of the Syrian National Army. In Iraq, the Iranians were developing their Shiite network of influence where Turkey supported Sunni parties, and more recently, in the Caucasus. Indeed, Turkey has provided active support to Azerbaijan in the war against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, while Iran views Baku’s growing power with considerable suspicion. Iran has explicitly opposed the creation of the Zangezur corridor—again supported by Turkey—intended to link Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijani autonomous province of Nakhchivan, because it would marginalize Tehran, which would lose its role as a transit point. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s closest allies. Numerous Iranian sources claim that the country serves as a launching point for Israeli operations targeting Iran, which shares a border with Azerbaijan. Recently, Iranian drones crashed in the province of Nakhchivan. President Ilham Aliyev’s reaction was very strong, and he promised a firm response. While Baku currently seems to be favoring caution, involvement in the conflict would force Turkey to contend with its Azerbaijani ally, the destabilization of Iran, and its rivalry with Tel Aviv. A mediating role for Ankara? Turkey itself was hit by two Iranian missiles. While Tehran denied responsibility for these strikes, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned Iran that Turkey’s patience “has its limits.” .

While Ankara wants to prevent the destabilization of Iran, it does not want the Iranian response to come at its expense, as it is not adopting a passive, wait-and-see posture, unlike the Gulf states.

Furthermore, unlike the other countries defined as threats by Israel, Turkey is a NATO member and an ally of the United States. Since Donald Trump’s election, US-Turkish relations have been strengthened, and the US ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, is working to reinforce ties between Ankara and Washington. This close relationship is tempering Israeli enthusiasm.

While Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statements on the reasons for the US entry into the war seem to indicate that the Trump administration is following Israel’s lead, the American president has repeatedly stated his hope for a short war.

Turkey, however, is precisely seeking to prevent a regional conflagration. Therefore, Ankara is instead aiming to play a mediating role in this conflict between Iran and Israel, two countries it perceives as geopolitical rivals in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey’s caution regarding this war is thus explained by a desire to maintain a balance of power and prevent Israeli, as well as Iranian, hegemony.